Beware Tax pitfalls when moving from one country to another

Beware Tax pitfalls when moving from one country to another

Be sure to beware tax pitfalls when moving residence

Swiss Courts ruled that a US citizen living in the UK could not get Swiss dividend tax back. With a judgment rendered on 27 November 2020 (case no. 2C_835/2017), the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (“FSC”) confirmed a decision by the Federal Administrative Court (“FAC”) of 24 August 2017 (decision no. A-1462/2016) concerning a an individual tax residence matter that arose in the context of certain dividend withholding tax (WHT) refund requests, which had been raised by the appellant (Mr. A, a US citizen) pursuant to the USA-Switzerland income tax treaty of 1996 (the “US Treaty”) with regards to Swiss dividends he had derived in the calendar years 2008-2010.

Both Swiss court instances confirmed the decision of the Federal Tax Administration (FTA) to reject the refund request and to claw back a WHT refund that it had already granted to Mr. A on a summary basis, as they concluded in fact that Mr. A failed to meet the tax residence criteria as defined under art. 4 (1)(a) of the US Treaty. The FTA had at some point suggested that Mr. A. should rather seek a partial WHT refund pursuant to the double taxation treaty between Switzerland and the UK (the “UK Treaty”).

However, Mr. A maintained that he held a “resident non-domiciled” tax status in the UK, which would effectively preclude him from benefits under the UK Treaty, as he did not remit the dividends in question to the UK and consequently did not owe any UK taxes thereon.

Facts of the Case

During the relevant periods Mr. A apparently lived in the UK, where he was treated as a UK “resident bot not domiciled” taxpayer. Mr. A held shares in several Swiss companies, from which he received substantial dividends, namely an aggregate amount of CHF 22.75 million in 2008 and 2009 and an amount of CHF 5,872,459 in 2010, all amounts before deduction of 35% WHT. Mr. A filed partial WHT refund requests with the FTA by using the Forms 82I, which is foreseen for Swiss WHT reclaims made by individuals pursuant to art. 10 of the US Treaty.

The reclaimed amounts corresponded to 20% of the gross dividends received. The FTA first satisfied the WHT reclaims for 2008 and 2009 for an aggregate amount of CHF 4.55 million on a summary basis, even though it had already noted that Mr. A had indicated a residential address in the UK. After receipt of Mr. A’s WHT refund request for 2010, the FTA explored further and suggested that Mr. A make a reclaim under the UK Treaty instead.

Upon Mr. A’s explanation that he could not utilize the UK treaty as he was taxed in the UK merely on a remittance basis, and after Mr. A had filed for a further partial WHT refund for the year 2012, this time indicating a residential address in the USA, the FTA finally rejected the open WHT requests and ordered Mr. A to return the already received WHT refund of CHF 4.55 million with 5% interest per annum. The FTA had concluded that Mr. A did not qualify as a US tax resident in the meaning of art. 4 (1) (a) US Treaty.

Under said provision, any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, nationality, [….] is considered a resident of that State. However, the second sentence of subparagraph (a) provides for a special rule pertaining to non-Swiss resident US citizens and non-US national green card holders in the United States: Such persons are considered resident in the United States only “… if such person has a substantial presence, permanent home or habitual abode in the United States”.

Mr. A. had maintained that he had at least a permanent home available to him in the United States, if not also a substantial presence, facts which the FTA had denied, however.

Relevant considerations of the FAC

The key considerations of the FAC focused on whether Mr. A – as a US citizen not resident in Switzerland – met any of the three criteria mentioned in the second sentence of subparagraph a of art 4 (1) US Treaty: having either (i) a substantial presence, (ii) a permanent home, or (iii) habitual abode in the United States. The FAC considered that the notion “substantial presence” derived from US law and referred to the Technical Explanation of the US Treaty by the US Treasury Department and § 7701(b)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.

On the other hand, the notions of permanent home and habitual abode are not used by US domestic law; hence in the FAC’s opinion, they should be construed in an autonomous manner. Those two notions re-appear in the tie breaker provision of art. 4 (3) (a) and (c) US Treaty, which is modeled along the OECD Model Tax Treaty.

Remarkably, the FAC considered that the second sentence of art. 4 (1) (a) US Treaty means in fact that a US citizen or green card holder (thereby automatically a US resident for US income tax purposes) who is not also a Swiss tax resident must prove particular ties to the United States in order to qualify as a US resident for purposes of the US Treaty.

The FAC went even as far as questioning whether the criteria of substantial presence, permanent home or habitual abode are really to be construed as strictly alternative criteria, as the literal wording of the provision (expressed by the word “or”) would suggest.

The FAC considered that in light of the tie breaker rule of art. 4 (3) US Treaty that uses similar criteria as well, it is important to stress that art. 4 (1) (a), 2nd sentence in any case requires a strong personal nexus with the United States of such category of US taxpayers in order to qualify as US resident under the US Treaty.

The FAC in that sense rejected a merely literal interpretation of that treaty provision solely based on the word “or”. In the FAC’s opinion, such a literal interpretation would deprive the criterion of “substantial presence” of any meaning; the FAC feels that it was not the intention of the Contracting States to grant access to the tax treaty benefits just to any persons with only minimal ties to a Contracting State.

It appears that the FAC gives the notion of permanent home in art. 4 (1) (a), 2nd sentence the meaning of a mere tie-breaker, which becomes relevant only where the taxpayer is treated as a resident under the domestic laws of two states, namely the United States and a third country (in the case at hand, the UK).

In the case at hand, as Mr. A did not meet the substantial presence test of US income tax law, nor did he have habitual abode in the United States, the FAC concluded in fact that Mr. A. had stronger ties to the UK than to the United States and discarded Mr. A’s argument that he had a permanent home in the United States available to him.

The fact that Mr. A had indicated his UK address on two of his WHT reclaim forms seems to have played a certain role. Furthermore. Mr. A also had a permanent home in the UK where he was active as a trader. Even though Mr. A. had insisted that he also possessed one or more homes in the United States available for his private use, the FAC expressed doubts as to whether Mr. A. used those home permanently. On those grounds the FAC refused to acknowledge that Mr. A met the US residency criteria of the US Treaty.

Moreover, the FAC pointed to a letter by Mr. A’s counsel to the FTA, in which such counsel had indicated that art. 27 (1) of the UK Treaty was applicable to his client. Under that rule, a UK resident who would principally be entitled to a (partial) relief from Swiss WHT pursuant the provisions of the UK-Switzerland treaty. And who is not taxed in the UK, under UK domestic rules, on the full amount of such Swiss revenues, but only on such portion thereof that is received in, or remitted to the UK shall only be entitled to the Swiss tax relief for the fraction received in, or remitted to, the UK.

The FAC stressed that reference to that provision of the UK Treaty implied that Mr. A was in fact a UK tax resident in the meaning of art. 1 and art. 4 of the UK Treaty. The FAC referred to the FSC decision 2C_436/2011 of 13 December 2011, according to which a UK resident taxpayer who is merely taxed on a remittance basis in the UK is principally considered as a UK tax resident under art.1 and art. 4 of the UK Treaty.

The FAC considered that Mr. A. would likely have been able to obtain a partial Swiss WHT refund pursuant to the UK Treaty, had he chosen to remit the relevant dividends to the UK; he should not be allowed to effectively circumvent that remittance requirement for benefits under the UK Treaty by invoking the US Treaty instead. https://www.reinarz-taxlegal.com/

RFF Lawyers is a tax law “boutique” firm in Portugal, specialized in tax and business law, both for corporate and institutional entities and individual clients. Rogério and his team at RFF Lawyers seek to foster lasting relationships - of confidence and trust - and to provide the proper legal solutions meeting the specific needs of each client, whether individual or corporate. 

Rogério Fernandes Ferreira

Rogério Fernandes Ferreira

RFF Lawyers
Peter Reinarz

Peter Reinarz

Reinarz
What happens to your digital assets upon death?

What happens to your digital assets upon death?

What happens to your digital assets upon death?

What happens to one’s digital assets upon death? A brief summary of the rules in the U.S.A. that determine how much of our digital information is available to our fiduciaries upon death.

While technology is constantly advancing in an attempt to improve our lives, a concession that we make is our privacy. Just how much of our information are we willing to share, with whom and when? Since much of what we do on our phones, laptops and computers is in the digital realm, the legislature and the courts in the US are now grappling with a new challenge: what happens to one’s digital assets on death?

In an effort to protect the privacy of the user, many tech companies are struggling with just how much information should be shared with the fiduciaries of a decedent.

Legislative Approach

So far, 41 US states have adopted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (the Uniform Law). In September 2016, New York added art.13-A to its Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (the Estates Law). This is largely based on the Uniform Law.

Despite the enactment of the Estates Law, which addresses the ability of a fiduciary to access digital assets, tech companies are still seeking court orders before releasing digital information to fiduciaries. At the time of writing, there have been at least four reported cases that address the access to digital assets of a decedent: three in New York, and another currently ongoing in Massachusetts.

These cases address ‘electronic communication’. If a digital asset is classified as an electronic communication, the fiduciary will need to provide proof of a user’s consent (usually in a will) or a court order in order to obtain access.

However, if the will is silent, what kind of digital assets should fiduciaries have access to? Currently, everything except the content of electronic communications, unless there is a terms of service agreement that provides otherwise.

Recent Case Law

In 2019, in Matter of Swezey, the petitioner sought access to photographs stored in his deceased spouse’s Apple iCloud account after the decedent died unexpectedly at the age of 45 with two surviving minors. The New York County Surrogate’s Court (the Court) held that the photographs were not electronic communications and that no lawful consent was required for disclosure under the Estates Law.

Interestingly, before applying the Estates Law, the Court explored the relationship between the petitioner and the decedent, stating that: their computers were adjacent to each other at home; they did not attempt to shield access to digital assets from one another; the petitioner viewed the images on the decedent’s computer; and together they used the photos to make holiday cards. Despite analysing their lifestyle, the Court ultimately held that the petitioner had the right to access the photos as a fiduciary because they were not electronic communications.

In 2017, the Court in Matter of Serrano ruled that if the information regarding the user’s contacts includes ‘information that identifies each person with which a user has had an electronic communication, the time and date of the communication, and the electronic address of the person’, it is a catalogue of electronic communication, and not electronic communication. Similarly, the Court determined that a calendar is not electronic communication because there is no transfer of information between parties.

Also in 2017, in Matter of White, the petitioner requested access to the decedent’s Gmail account to obtain information about assets that he needed to identify and administer. While the Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court in New York held that Google was required to disclose the decedent’s ‘contacts information stored and associated with the email account’, it erred on the side of privacy and held that greater access could be granted later, but only if warranted.

Avoiding Challenges

To address these new challenges, many companies have created online tools that allow trusted individuals to gain access to an account after the user dies, such as Facebook’s ‘legacy contact’ and Google’s Inactive Account Manager. While some companies have attempted to grant access to users’ accounts, not all companies provide such options.

US law may be starting to catch up to technology. However, discussions about access to and disposition of digital assets should be held early on during estate­-planning conversations with clients, and carried into the necessary documents, to ensure that fiduciaries and loved ones are granted the intended amount of control. https://www.duanemorris.com/

digital assets

Reshma Shah

Duane Morris